











Fabio D’Orlando, Francesco Ferrante and Gabriele Ruiu 
Department of Economics, University of Cassino 






































Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche 
Università degli Studi di Cassino 
Via S.Angelo Località Folcara, Cassino (FR) 
Tel. +39 0776 2994734 Email dipse@eco.unicas.it 
  
  
Culturally-based beliefs and labour market institutions 
 




This paper has two main goals. The first is to provide empirical evidence that 
differences in labour market institutions across countries and, specifically, in how they 
provide protection to workers, can be attributed to underlying differences in culturally-
based prior beliefs: in particular, people’s fatalism and trust in others. The second goal 
is to single out the socio-economic factors associated with these beliefs and the role of 
education in this regard. 
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Introduction 
The interactions between culture and institutions and the link between institutions and 
economic performance are at the forefront of economic analysis. In particular, fatalism and 
trust in others appear two among the most important culturally-based prior beliefs that impact 
on institutions. But while the connection between trust and institutions has been widely 
investigated, the role of fatalism, notwithstanding its importance in people’s socio-economic 
attitudes, is still neglected. It is surprising that a personality trait so important in 
characterizing people’s expectations concerning the link between actions and results has 
received so little attention, particularly in regard to analysis of the labour market and its 
institutions. 
The assumption adopted here, and which finds support in the empirical as well as 
theoretical literature (Guiso et al. 2002, 2006 and 2009; Tabellini, 2005), is that culturally-
based prior beliefs are quite stable and that they can consequently be treated as exogenous 
factors in the political process leading to the implementation of labour market institutions.  
On these premises, the first goal of our paper is to verify whether international 
differences in the way protection is provided to workers, and in particular in the extent of job 
protection, may reflect underlying differences in culturally-based beliefs. Drawing on 
D’Orlando and Ferrante (2008 and 2009), we point out that fatalism and trust in others should 
have major impacts on the demand for labour market regulation and, in particular, on the 
demand for job protection, i.e. employment protection legislation. From this it follows that 
differences in the levels of fatalism and trust in others, to the extent that people’s preferences 
affect the choices of institutions, should explain the existing differences in labour market 
regulations among countries and, eventually, the extent of political opposition to deregulation. 
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The second goal of our paper is to investigate the socio-economic and demographic 
determinants of, or at least the socio-economic and demographic traits that appear to be 
associated with fatalism and trust in others. Specifically, as to be expected, we find that 
people’s prior beliefs depend, over and above the effects of their innate propensities and 
socioeconomic backgrounds, on their cognitive skills and on non-cognitive traits acquired 
through education. On these grounds, we suggest that poorly-educated individuals are those 
most affected by culturally transmitted beliefs such as fatalism and trust in others. 
In order to provide support for these contentions we carry out an empirical 
investigation based on the World Value Survey which expands and strengthens D’Orlando 
and Ferrante’s (2008 and 2009) analysis. Like Aghion et al. (2008), we find that trust in 
others is negatively related to the demand for job protection and, like Ferrante and D'Orlando 
(2008 and 2009), we find a positive relation between fatalism and the demand for job 
protection . Moreover, our estimates show that employment protection legislation and 
unemployment benefits are effective means with which to reduce the workers’ perception of  
insecurity and that, in this regard, the quality of the legal system matters as well.     
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 furnishes evidence of the main 
differences existing among the levels and modes of protecting workers and their families 
against unemployment risk in the OECD; section 2 discusses the influence of culturally-based 
prior beliefs on labour market institutions; section 3 presents the empirical strategy and 
results; section 4 concludes.  
 
1. Some empirical evidence: Labour market institutions in OECD Countries. 
 
Workers can be protected against unemployment by means of two main labour market 
institutions: unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL). It is 
consequently a matter of interest to determine whether different countries have used these two 
instruments in different ways and, if so, to try to understand why they have done so. 
Empirical evidence confirms that the combination of these two forms of protection 
differs greatly among the 20 OECD countries examined. Table 1 reports EPL, this being the 
well-known OECD index of labour market rigidity which takes account of a large set of 
factors regarding labour contract regulations (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud 2000), and the 
replacement ratio RR, i.e. an index of generosity of UB, for twenty countries and for three 
years (1982, 1992, 2002). In particular, RR is given by the average benefit replacement rate
1 
during the first year of unemployment. 
                                                           
1  See Clark et al. (2005) for a brief discussion of the advantages/disadvantages of using indicators of this type.  
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Table 1: EPL rigidity index and average replacement rate in 20 OECD Countries 
 
Country EPL  EPL  EPL  RR  RR  RR   
   1982  1992  2002  1982  1992  2002   
Australia  0.9  0.9  1.2  21.95 26.45 23.49   
Austria 2.2  2.2  2.2  32.67  34.8  38.96   
Belgium 3.2  3.2  2.2  51.225  47.95  45.49   
Canada 0.8  0.8  0.8  55.85  57.8  45.56   
Switzerland 1.1  1.1  1.1  38.2  67.65  75   
Germany 3.2  3.2  2.35  39  38  37.95   
Denmark 2.3  2.3  1.4  79.25  75.5  64.42   
Spain  3.8  3.8  3.1  77.25 67.75 63.53   
Finland 2.3  2.17  2  31.875  59.81  53.62   
France 2.78  3  3  59.5  58.4  61.3   
Great  Britain  0.6  0.6  0.7  29.45 23.05 18.46   
Ireland  0.9  0.9       0.9  53.06  43.56  36.93   
Italy 3.6  3.6  2.13  1.81  8.81  58.31   
Japan 2.69  2.12  1.8  26.2  29.8  25.35   
Netherlands 2.7  2.7  2.1  65  70  70.99   
Norway 2.9  2.9  2.6  48  61.5  63.79   
New  Zealand  0.9  0.9  1.5  29.42 29.29 27.96   
Portugal  4.1  3.85 3.7 23.64 65 69.66   
Sweden 3.5  3.5  2.2  84.1  87.25  75.77   
USA  0.2  0.2  0.2  32.55 25.15 29.19   
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006)           
  
The twenty countries considered here can be divided into two groups: Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, USA are characterized by low 
levels of EPL stringency, while  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden display relatively high levels of 
stringency. The Scandinavian, Mediterranean (especially in the last decade) and Central 
European countries (with the exception of Austria and Germany) tend to exhibit more 
generous replacement rates than both the English-speaking European countries and other 
extra-European countries (with the exception of Canada). We also create a normalized version 
of EPL and RR dividing the indicators by the respective sample maximum. In figures 1a, 1b 
and 1c we plot the normalized RR against the normalized EPL for three years (1982, 1992, 
2002) in order to gain an immediate picture of different countries’ choices between regulation 
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As shown by table 2, which reports the stringency of EPL for regular and temporary 
contracts, reforms in countries characterized by strict regulation have been implemented 
principally by giving greater flexibility to temporary contracts while leaving permanent ones 
unchanged, thereby creating a “dual” labour market.  
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Table 2: EPL regular contracts and EPL temporary contracts   
Country 
EPL 
reg EPL  temp
EPL 
reg EPL  temp
EPL 
reg EPL  temp
    1982 1982 1992 1992 2002 2002 
Australia  1 0.875 1 0.875  1.5  0.875 
Austria  2.92 1.5 2.92 1.5 2.92 1.5 
Belgium  1.68 4.625 1.68 4.625 1.72 2.625 
Canada  1.32 0.25 1.32 0.25 1.32 0.25 
Switzerland  1.16 1.125 1.16 1.125 1.16 1.125 
Germany  2.58 3.75 2.58 3.75 2.68  2.025 
Denmark  1.52 3.125 1.52 3.125 1.47 1.375 
Spain  3.88 3.75 3.88 3.75 2.61 3.5 
Finland  2.78 1.875 2.47 1.875 2.17 1.875 
France 2.51  3.06  2.34  3.625  2.46  3.625 
Great  Britain  0.95 0.25 0.95 0.25 1.12  0.375 
Ireland  1.6 0.25 1.6 0.25 1.6 0.25 
Italy  1.77 5.375 1.77 5.375 1.77  2.5 
Japan 2.38  3  2.44  1.8  2.44  1.25 
Netherlands  3.08 2.375 3.08 2.375 3.05 1.19 
Norway  2.25 3.54 2.25 3.54 2.25  2.875 
New Zealand  1.35  0.375  1.35  0.38  1.7  1.25 
Portugal  4.83 3.375 4.33 3.375 4.33  3 
Sweden  2.9 4.08 2.9 4.08  2.86  1.625 
USA  0.17 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.25 
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006)         
 
The economic literature has proposed various explanations for these different attitudes 
to workers’ protection. Here we briefly discuss the most frequent of them.  
2. Culturally-based beliefs and the demand for job protection 
2.1 Why protect workers and how?  
The economic literature puts forward two main explanations for the origin of 
employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits. On the one hand, there is the 
belief that the existence of these labour market institutions reflects the equilibrium resulting 
from the interaction between insiders (employed workers) and outsiders (unemployed 
workers). If the former have more political power, they are able to impose a system of job 
protection that strengthens their bargaining position at the expense of the unemployed and of 
society as a whole (Saint-Paul 1993, 1996, 1997, 2002; Boeri et al. 2004). In this regard, 
Boeri et al. (2004) have shown the existence of a trade-off between EPL and UB, where the 
different locations of countries along this continuum stem from heterogeneity in the skills 
levels of labor force. In particular, they argue that, given the redistributive nature of EPL 
(from high-skilled to low-skilled workers), countries characterized by a less skilled labor 
force and a compressed wage structure (with low wage differentials between high- and low-
skilled workers) should prefer EPL to UB.  
On the other hand, there is the view that employment protection legislation is an 
instrument that furnishes social insurance to risk-adverse workers in an  incomplete market 
context (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; Agell, 1999 and 2000; Bertola, 2004). According to 
this approach, “[I]n the special case where workers’ marginal utility is constant, the model 
illustrates the simple insights outlined above: EPL is neutral in steady state if it mandates 
redundancy payments directly from employers to workers, and is welfare-decreasing if it 
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entails dead-weight losses. But when labour-income uncertainty is not privately diversifiable, 
then collectively administered EPL can address that imperfection, and improve both 
productive efficiency and workers' welfare” (Bertola, 2004, p. 44). The latter approach 
provides a rationale for job protection but does not address the choice of how to provide it. 
Within these approaches no room is left for the role of culturally-based workers’ and 
households’ preferences for job security.  
2.2 Culture and Institutions 
Only recently have economists begun to deal with culture by investigating how  it 
affects economic performance by shaping institutions. The concept of culture and culturally-
based prior beliefs is too broad for empirical investigation. Hence, we must first clarify the 
notion of culture that is adopted here. To do so, we follow Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2006, p.699): “[W]e define culture as those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, 
religious and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation”. These 
customary beliefs indubitably have an impact on people’s choices, attitudes and behaviors, 
but the view that culture impacts on institutions is subject to the criticism of reverse causality, 
i.e. the argument according to which the causal relation does not go only from culture to 
institutions but also operates vice versa: that is, culture shapes institutions and institutions 
shape culture.
2 To justify the choice of considering culturally-based beliefs as determinants of 
economic behavior, and hence of institutions (in our case, labor market institutions), it is 
therefore of crucial importance that the cultural traits which we consider not only influence 
economic behavior and institutions but also are quite stable over time, being a legacy 
transmitted from one generation to the next.  
The distinction between psychological or personality traits and culturally-based prior 
beliefs is not clear-cut. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the large body of studies 
in psychology, sociology and anthropology on this subject. Instead, in light of these studies, 
its contention is that prior beliefs pertain to the social sphere: in other words, culturally-based 
beliefs are a social construct, whereas psychological traits belong to the individual sphere 
(Church, 2000).   
Among the cultural traits that may have an impact on labor market institutions, we 
focus on trust in others and fatalism, in that these appear to be among the most important 
factors motivating economic behaviors and, specifically, the demand for labour market 
regulation and workers’ protection. Moreover, they easily pass the test of stability and 
exogeneity with respect to labour market institutions. However, respect for others, confidence 
in the link between effort and economic success, and public spiritedness are equally 
considered in the literature.  
In particular, as noted by Tabellini (2005), a low level of trust in others and scant 
confidence in the link between effort and economic success (in our interpretation, high 
fatalism) are different cultural traits, but they are both typical of hierarchical societies 
characterized by marked pessimism about the correctness of other people’s actions. In such 
societies, the community requests the state to intervene by enacting rigorous regulations that 
prevent people from assuming opportunistic behaviors. These societies are also characterized 
by the central role of the family in the individual’s life. Young people tend to remain longer 
in the family of origin and to form their own families later. The traditional family values 
                                                           
2  For instance Aghion et al. (2008) propose a model where if people expect to live in a civil community, they 
expect low levels of regulation, and so invest in social capital. Their beliefs are justified, and investment leads to 
civility, low regulation, and high output. When in contrast people expect to live in an uncivil community, they 
do not invest in social capital and remain uncivil and unproductive. Their beliefs are again justified, because a 
lack of investment leads to incivility, high regulation, high corruption, and low production. 
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(obedience, respect for the father, etc.) are given priority over all other values (autonomy, 
good civic attitudes, etc). The family comes first, and people outside the household are 
regarded with suspicion and considered untrustworthy. This ‘family-centered’ way of life 
may be an important determinant of the persistence of cultural traits. 
Empirical analysis has devoted by far the most attention to trust; by contrast, fatalism 
has been treated in the medical and epidemiological literature but neglected by the economic 
literature.  
Aghion et al. (2009) show that distrust in others is strongly positively correlated with 
various measures of regulation (product and labor market regulation, judicial procedure). 
Algan and Cahuc (2006a) note that the Danish flexicurity model, characterized by high 
unemployment benefits and low job protection, relies on strong public-spiritedness and is 
hardly implementable in the Continental and Mediterranean European countries, where these 
values are less strong. Tabellini (2005) argues that culture, measured by indicators of 
individual values and beliefs such as trust,  respect for others and confidence in the link 
between effort and economic success, is a fundamental channel through which history 
influences the functioning of current institutions. Barro and McCleary (2002) argued that 
stronger religious beliefs stimulate economic growth because they sustain aspects of 
individual behavior that enhance productivity, and they viewed the relation between religion 
and economic growth as a causal one. Finally, Pinotti (2009) has developed a model whose 
main conclusions are that, within each economy, the individual demand for regulation 
depends negatively on trust towards others, and that ignoring trust (as a proxy for average 
trustworthiness) biases estimations of the effects of market failures upwards.  
D’Orlando and Ferrante (2009) argue that less educated workers with a fatalistic view 
of life tend to demand more job protection (where by ‘fatalistic view of life’ is meant a 
propensity to believe that life events are driven by fate rather than by actions). Wu (2005) 
analyzed the role of fatalism in determining household savings behavior, finding that people 
characterized by fatalistic beliefs are less likely to save. There is strong evidence in the 
medical literature on the role of fatalism in health screening behavior (Straughan and Seow 
1998, Nelson et al. 2002, Niederdeppe and Levy 2007). In particular, Nelson et al. (2002) 
showed that fatalism, viewed as a cultural belief closely bound up with ethnical origin, is 
associated with delays in seeking health care. 
Licht et al. (2004) focus on three cultural traits: autonomy/embeddedness (relative to 
the relation between individual and group), hierarchical/egalitarianism (relative to the ways in 
which socially responsible behavior is ensured), and  mastery/harmony (relative to 
humankind’s relations with the natural and social worlds). They find that countries oriented to 
autonomy and egalitarianism are characterized by better social institutions (greater rule of 
law, less corruption, more democratic accountability). In order to assess the causality from 
culture to institutions, they used the grammar of pronouns as an instrumental variable for 
autonomy/embeddedness. Drawing on psychological evidence, they argued that languages in 
which it is permitted to drop the person-indexing pronouns (I, you, etc.) reflect a more 
embedded culture. By contrast, languages that require the explicit use of pronouns place more 
emphasis on a person’s contextualization and uniqueness. 
Finally, Algan and Cahuc (2006a) explain the difficulty of implementing a UB system 
in the Continental and Mediterranean countries as due to a scarcity of public-spiritedness, 
which they view as culturally determined. The authors show that the stringency of 
employment protection in Mediterranean countries can be partly explained by cultural values 
embedded in religions. In particular they find that, compared to Catholic countries, Protestant 
ones tend to reduce the level of employment protection, while Muslim and Orthodox ones 
(with a very similar effect) tend to increase it. 
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2.3 Fate and Fatalism 
Although the precise meaning of the word fatalism changes across cultures and 
religions, it can be linked with people’s propensity to believe that their destinies are ruled by 
an unseen power – Fate – rather than by their will. Indeed, the concept of locus of control 
developed in psychology
3 is akin to the concept of fatalism, because moving from an internal 
to an external locus of control inevitably entails an increasingly fatalistic view of life.  
The concept of fatalism has been central to the development of religious and 
philosophical thought. Of course, this is not surprising because the question f whether or not 
our destinies are under our control is at the root of our thoughts and has shaped our cultural 
evolution. As in the case of trust, fatalism can be expected to be culturally transmitted from 
one generation to the next. But there are differences regarding how fatalism is conceived 
within different cultures and religions that should be taken into account when investigating 
the role of fatalism in different societies.  In classical thought, as well as in Oriental religion, 
fate is a dark and sinister power related to a tragic vision of life. It connotes, not the absence 
of freedom but the subjection of freedom. It is the transcendent necessity in which freedom is 
entangled. Fate is blind, inscrutable, and inescapable. Christianity substituted the Hellenistic 
concept of fate with the doctrine of divine providence. Whereas fate is the portentous, 
impersonal power that rules over human freedom, providence liberates humankind to fulfill 
the destiny for which it was created. Fate means the abrogation of freedom; providence means 
the realization of authentic freedom through submission to divine guidance. Fatalism was 
present among the ancient Stoics, and it pervades much of the thought of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Islam.  
2.4 Fatalism, trust in others and social protection 
Apart from their impact on other economic institutions, culturally-based beliefs are 
important elements to consider when seeking to explain the observed heterogeneity in how 
different societies furnish job protection. Our contention is that fatalism and trust in others 
play a separate and essential role in the demand for job protection and, more importantly, in 
the choice of the preferred way to provide such protection.  
Fatalism and trust in others affect the demand for protection through different 
mechanisms. Drawing on D’Orlando and Ferrante (2009) and extending their analysis on the 
empirical side, we suggest that the subjective cost of unemployment can be divided into a 
monetary cost (the income loss) and a psychological cost (the subjective perception of being 
unable to cope with drastic negative changes in life). Fatalism affects the non-pecuniary, 
psychological costs of unemployment, i.e. a utility loss that does not disappear even if the 
income loss is entirely off-set by unemployment benefits. The argument runs as follows. 
International evidence shows that more strictly regulated markets have lower inflow rates and 
outflow rates from unemployment. And the theoretical literature is unequivocal in arguing 
that regulating a competitive labour market through employment protection legislation has no 
effect on the average level of unemployment, although it increases the variability of 
employment (see among others Bertola and Rogerson 1997, Garibaldi 1998, Agell 1999, 
Fitoussi et al. 2000, Blanchard and Landier 2001, Boeri and Garibaldi 2007, Freeman 2005). 
Hence, a typical worker should choose his/her preferred regime by comparing the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary net-benefits of two alternative states of the world in which the average 
unemployment rate is the same: one in which the labour market is regulated, so that the 
frequency of unemployment is lower and its duration is longer, and another in which the 
                                                           
3 Locus of control refers to a person's belief about what causes the good or bad results in his or her life, either in 
general or in a specific area (Rotter, 1954; 1990). People’s locuses of control can be either internal or external, 
depending on whether or not they tend to believe that their actions ultimately determine personal outcomes.     
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labour market is unregulated, so that the frequency is higher but the duration shorter. 
Typically, unemployment benefits compensate (at least in part) for the pecuniary losses 
stemming from joblessness, but they are not designed to provide relief for the non-pecuniary 
losses. By contrast, job protection can compress the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment by 
reducing the number of its episodes in a person’s working life. If this is so, then the choice of 
seeking protection through stricter job security legislation is affected by the psychological 
factors that determine the relative costs of episodes of unemployment as such, and their 
length. Moreover, in general, frequent episodes of unemployment affect workers more than 
do a few longer episodes. The higher psychological costs of frequent episodes of 
unemployment ensue from the circumstance that “individuals first reacted strongly to 
unemployment and then shifted back toward their former (or ‘baseline’) levels of life 
satisfaction. However, on average, individuals did not completely return to their former levels 
of life satisfaction, even after they became re-employed. The findings suggests that even a 
short period of unemployment can cause an alteration in a person’s long-term set-point” 
(Clark et al. 2004, p. 8). Hence, repeated episodes of unemployment have a negative 
psychological impact that unemployment benefits are unable to remedy because the income 
that would be necessary to compensate people for the loss of well-being due to 
unemployment is very large; and, according to many authors (see e.g. Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann 1998, Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald 2003, Frey and Stutzer 2002), it 
implies a replacement ratio much greater than one. Our argument is that the negative 
psychological impact of this phenomenon is particularly severe for fatalistic people. The latter 
would consequently prefer employment protection legislation which reduces unemployment 
episodes (even if it increases the duration of unemployment) rather than unemployment 
benefits which compensate only the monetary but not the psychological costs of 
unemployment. Thus the varying impacts of these psychological costs on workers 
characterized by different degrees of fatalism can explain the different choices made by 
different countries. 
Conversely, in light of Algan and Cahuc’s (2006a) findings, trust in others affects the 
expected cost-effectiveness of social public expenditure, and in particular of UB, in providing 
protection to those in need (Ferrante 2004). Empirical evidence furnishes strong support for 
this view: social transfers have been shown to be less cost-effective than expected owing to 
various political and institutional failures. Notably, social transfers are difficult to allocate 
according to principles of progressivity, i.e. according to people’s real needs. In addition, also 
because of their partially discretionary nature, they are fairly easily appropriated by rent 
seekers, free riders and special interest groups. Furthermore, tax and social contribution 
evasion can significantly affect the fiscal system’s ability to raise revenues and its degree of 
progressivity. Therefore, if average trust in others is low, reliance on social public 
expenditure and unemployment benefits as effective means to provide protection will be low 
as well. 
Accordingly, our main prediction is that, in the absence of major political distortions, 
fatalism and the stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL) are positively related. 
Furthermore, we expect to find that the overall quality of the legal system affects people’s 
perceptions of the need for protection in the labour market. 
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3. The empirical strategy  
3.1 The World Values Survey 
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a worldwide investigation of the basic values and 
beliefs of individuals in a large cross-section of countries (more than 80) conducted by the 
World Values Survey Association. It has been carried out in four waves: 1980-1984 (20 
independent countries plus Northern Ireland), 1990-1994 (42 independent countries plus 
Northern Ireland), 1994-1999 (53 independent countries plus Puerto Rico), 1999-2004 (69 
independent countries plus Northern Ireland and Puerto Rico). The survey  contains 
information about demographics (sex, age, education, etc.), self-reported economic 
conditions, political preferences, attitudes, and religion. Table 3 reports summary statistics for 
the variables used in our analysis, i.e. job security, fatalism and trust. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Country Job  Security* Fatalism** Trust* Country JobSecurity* Fatalism** Trust* CountryJobSecurity*  Fatalism** Trust*
ALB 0.833 5.369  0.256  DEU  0.734  6.976  0.341  PRT  0.692  6.692  0.174 
DZA 0.863 6.655  0.112  GBR  0.609  6.970  0.395  PRI 0.716  8.284  0.124 
ARG 0.619 7.210  0.202  GRC  0.653 7.000 0.269  ROU  0.749  6.426  0.150 
ARM 0.773  5.658  0.247  HUN  0.775 6.526 0.413  RUS  0.589 5.690  0.279 
AUS 0.622 7.402  0.431  ISL 0.506  7.375  0.379  SAU  0.666  6.604  0.530 
AUT 0.697 7.529  0.327  IND 0.839  6.243  0.516  SRB  0.500  6.030  0.276 
AZE 0.743 5.611  0.205  IDN  0.958  7.246  0.653  SGP  0.659  7.248  0.147 
BGD 0.872 5.977  0.222  IRN 0.771 6.618 0.415  SVK  0.690  6.456  0.213 
BLR 0.464 5.329  0.296  IRL 0.613  7.104  0.322  SVN  0.845  6.814  0.182 
BEL 0.426 6.505  0.313  ITA  0.642  6.231  0.422  ZAF  0.736  6.969  0.206 
BIH 0.883  6.004  0.219  JPN  0.673  5.713  0.277  KOR  0.658  6.716  0.328 
BRA 0.648 7.318  0.050  JOR 0.964 7.169  0.167  ESP  0.667  6.651  0.344 
BGR 0.725 5.564  0.286  KGZ  0.745 7.064  0.111  SWE  0.577  7.296  0.623 
CAN 0.665 7.535  0.455  MKD  0.876 5.921 0.188  CHE  0.683  7.184  0.370 
CHL 0.706 7.132  0.224  MLT  0.615  7.345  0.290  TWN  0.749  7.431  0.382 
CHN 0.610 6.970  0.553  MEX  0.662 7.618 0.184  TZA  0.793  5.800  0.081 
COL 0.371 7.888  0.112  MDA  0.845  5.914  0.228  TUR  0.963  5.291  0.129 
HRV 0.744 6.741  0.229  MAR  0.983 6.256 0.526  UGA  0.812 6.818  0.078 
CZE 0.599 6.660  0.267  NLD 0.365  6.256 0.491  UKR  0.721 5.236  0.297 
DNK 0.511 7.115  0.588  NZL 0.720 7.836 0.219  USA  0.726 7.591  0.415 
DOM 0.655  7.373  0.264  NGA 0.844  6.931  0.411  URY 0.771 7.020  0.216 
EGY 0.807 5.470  0.379  NIRL 0.701  7.231  0.639  VEN 0.872  8.013  0.137 
EST 0.557  6.119  0.242  NOR 0.753  7.013  0.082  VNM  0.821 7.492  0.411 
FIN 0.641  7.602  0.553  PER  0.479  7.065  0.269  ZWE  0.791  5.771  0.112 
FRA 0.435 6.352  0.228  PHL  0.749  6.918  0.071         
GEO 0.650 6.168  0.187  POL  0.702  6.189  0.267  Overall 0.683 6.644  0.301 
* Percentages; **Mean 
Note: Calculated on the four waves 
 
These variables have been determined in the following ways. 
1) Jobsecurity is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent answers that 
an important aspect of a job is “a good job security” to the following question: “Here 
are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and 
tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job: good pay; not too 
much pressure; good job security; a job respected by people in general; good hours; an 
opportunity to use initiative; generous holidays; a job in which you feel you can 
achieve something; a responsible job; a job that is interesting; a job that meets one’s 
abilities”. We interpret this variable as a proxy for the demand for job security among 
individuals. If  workers believe that job security is important, they demand it.  
2) Our measure of fatalism is based on answers to the following question: “Some 
people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other 
people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use 
this scale (1 means “none at all” and 10 means “a great deal”) to indicate how much 
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freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” 
Therefore the  higher the value of the variable, the lower the individual’s fatalistic 
tendencies.  A similar definition of fatalism can be found in D’Orlando and Ferrante 
(2008), Tabellini (2005) and Wu (2005). 
3) Trust measures the level of trust in other people and is based on answers to the 
following question:  “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need  to be very careful in dealing with people?”.  The variable is 
equal to one if participants report that most people can be trusted, and zero otherwise. 
An analogous definition of trust can be found for example in Guiso et al. (2002) or in 
Aghion et al. (2008). 
The sample may be not representative for some poor countries.
4 In Nigeria, for 
example, only more educated and wealthier people living in urban areas were interviewed. To 
tackle this problem, in the investigation reported here we always carried out a preliminary 
analysis which included all countries, followed by a further analysis limited to countries with 
more reliable samples.  
3.2 The stability of culturally-based beliefs  
Theoretical reasoning as well as empirical evidence support the conclusion that 
culturally-based beliefs are stable and exogenous with respect to institutions (Guiso et al., 
2006). Nevertheless, to check whether fatalism  and trust in others are sufficiently stable 
cultural traits at country level, we created a country index of fatalism (IF) and a country index 
of  trust in others (TO) for the first and the fourth wave of WVS investigation, and we 
computed the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for each indicator between the two periods.  IF 
was given by the mean fatalism at country level,
5 TO was the percentage of individuals who 
answered most people can be trusted to the relative question. We found a strong correlation 
across periods for both IF and TO, respectively 0.6974 (sig. 0.0013) and 0.78 (sig. 0.0002). In 
figures 2 and 3, we plot IF and TO calculated on the fourth wave against the same index 
calculated on the first wave. These results provide some support for the idea that fatalism and 
trust in others are stable culturally-based beliefs and that they can be treated as exogenous 
factors in our estimations.  
 
                                                           
4 In all the regressions reported, we used sample weights suggested by the survey’s authors to ensure that our 
estimates were nationally representative for each country and each wave. However, the weights could not adjust 
cases where groups of the population were not samples at all. These countries with problems of non 
representativity that could not be corrected were (see the technical information at 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ for detailed explanations): Argentina (first three waves), Bangladesh (third 
wave), Chile (last three waves), China (second and third wave), Dominican Rep. (third wave), Egypt (fourth 
wave), India (second and third wave), Mexico (second wave), Nigeria (second and third wave), South Africa 
(second wave). 
 
5  To consider the widest time interval available, we limited our analysis to only eighteen countries (Argentina, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malta, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, USA), which had been surveyed on both the first and the fourth 
wave.  
 























































.7 .8 .9 1
Index of Fatalism 1981

















































.4 .6 .8 1
Index of Trust 1981







3.3 The determinants of fatalism and trust in others 
Before addressing the role played by fatalism and trust in others in the demand of job 
protection in the OECD countries, it is convenient to analyze the socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics associated with these variables. For this purpose, we carried out a 
preliminary analysis of these cultural traits for the complete set of countries. The regressions 
reported in table 4 exploit all four waves but exclude some countries
6 because we lacked 
information about variables crucial for our analysis (demand of job security and fatalism). We 
                                                           
6  Countries for which we did not have information about Job Security were: Colombia (third wave), El Salvador 
(third wave), Iraq (fourth wave), Israel (fourth wave), Rep. Of Korea (third wave), Pakistan (third wave and 
fourth wave), Poland (second wave), South Africa (third wave) Countries for which we did not have information 
about fatalism were El Salvador (third wave), Israel (fourth wave), Pakistan (third and fourth wave), Iraq (fourth 
wave), Belarus (second wave), Colombia (third wave), Poland (third wave), Turkey (second wave), Korea (third 
wave), South Africa (third wave), Switzerland (second wave), Great Britain (third wave), Venezuela (fourth 
wave). 
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ran an ordered probit to establish if and how individual, cultural and institutional 
characteristics (captured by country fixed effects) are associated with individual’s fatalism. In 
so doing, we had two main purposes: to establish whether fatalism is a belief only determined 
by objective individual characteristics (such as income, age, gender, health) or also by 
cultural legacy (as religion), and to explore the specific link between education and fatalism. 
In particular, building on D’Orlando and Ferrante (2009), we expected to find that more 
educated people are less willing to believe that life-events are driven by fate rather than by 
actions.
7
Table 4 shows the results of the ordered probit of fatalism on individual 
characteristics, religious denomination, country fixed effects and wave fixed effects. Column 
(a) reports the results of the analysis for all the countries in the sample, while column (b) 
shows the previous regression on a sample where non-representative countries were excluded. 
The signs of the coefficients are those expected.  
The meaning of the great majority of variables is self-evident. As regards religion, we 
created a dummy variable termed ‘atheist’ if an individual did not belong to a religious 
denomination and a dummy for each of the other “dominant” religions
8: Roman Catholic 
(indicated as romcatholic), Orthodox, Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, Other 
religion (this has been indicated as otherrel and includes all religions different from the 
previous ones). The relative question in WVS is the following: “Do you belong to a religious 
denomination? In case you do, answer which one”. Education was measured by age (we 
named this variable ageeduc) at which the interviewed had completed (or expected to 
complete) his/her education, excluding apprenticeships.
9 A similar measure for education can 
be found in Guiso et al. (2002). We included a control for the respondent’s age in our 
analysis. To capture non-linear effects, we also included the square of age (agesquare). To 
capture gender effects we included a dummy variable (termed ‘female’) equal to one if the 
respondent’s sex was female. It is also like that the perceived state of health influences 
fatalistic behavior. We consequently included this control as well, considering the question: 
“All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? (1=very poor; 2 = poor; 
3 = fair; 4= good; 5 = very good)”. We created an indicator equal to one for each state of 
health. These variables were respectively named vphealth, phealth, fhealth, ghealth, vghealth. 
For income we built three indicators of its level
10 which we named highincome, 
mediumincome, lowincome on the basis of the answers to the following question: “Here is a 
scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, 
salaries, pensions, and other income that comes in. Just give the letter of the group your 
household falls into, before taxes and other deductions” (income categories are coded by 
decile for each society, 1=lowest decile, 10=highest decile). 
Table 4: Ordered Probit Fatalism 
                                                           
7 We are aware that educational choices may be affected by people’s fatalism. In this case, there would be an 
endogeneity problem to deal with.  
 
8  By ‘dominant religions’ is meant religions with the highest numbers of followers. 
 
9  We know that this measure may in some cases overestimate the level of education, so that the effect of 
education may have been underestimated. Unfortunately, the alternative measure of education, i.e. the highest 
level of education achieved, is available only for a limited number of countries and not for all periods. However, 
we repeated the analysis using this alternative measure (hence with a lower number of observations) and we 
obtained very similar results. 
 
10  This division of income levels is the same as proposed by the survey authors. See  the codebook of  European 
and World Value Surveys Integrated data file at http://130.15.161.74/webdoc/ssdc/cdbksnew/wvs/3975_Codebook.pdf 
and http://www.nrf.ac.za/SADA/CodebookPDF/S0069.pdf for detailed information. 











































N 179930 N 163942
Pseudo R2 .0221 Pseudo R2 .0235
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<0.01
Table 4: Ordered Probit Fatalism
age ‐.00502*** age ‐.00505***
agesquare agesquare
ageeduc ageeduc
female ‐.03380*** female ‐.03478***
highincome highincome
lowincome ‐.07732*** lowincome ‐.07810***
widowed widowed
separated separated ‐.00466
divorced ‐.02611 divorced ‐.02911*
cohabitation ‐.03336** cohabitation ‐.02876*
married ‐.01677* married ‐.01826*
ghealth ‐.13001*** ghealth ‐.13023***
fhealth ‐.24550*** fhealth ‐.24681***
phealth ‐.42605*** phealth ‐.42905***
vphealth ‐.52901*** vphealth ‐.53264***
parttime parttime ‐.00076899
selfemployed selfemployed
retired ‐.01090 retired ‐.00498
housewife ‐.04553*** housewife ‐.04579***
student ‐.03554*** student ‐.03096**
unemployed ‐.13304*** unemployed ‐.13826***
otherjob ‐.08959*** otherjob ‐.07166***
romcatholic ‐.01853** romcatholic ‐.01577*
orthodox ‐.08529*** orthodox ‐.08649***
protestant protestant
jew ‐.09026* jew ‐.10385*
hindu hindu







We controlled for marital status by creating an indicator for each of the following 
statuses: single, cohabiting, married, separated, divorced, widowed. We also included 
indicators for each employment status on the basis of the question: “Are you employed now 
or not? If yes: About how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job” (1 
= full time; 2 = part time; 3 = self employed; 4 = retired; 5 = housewife; 6 = students; 7 = 
unemployed; 8 = other). 
Turning to the results of the empirical analysis, income exhibits a negative 
relationship with fatalism. The reference category is medium income: the coefficient of high 
income has a positive sign, while low income takes a negative sign. This result is highly 
statistically significant in both column (a) and column (b). 
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As regards education, the coefficient of ageeducation takes a positive sign and is 
highly significant. Hence when education increases, so too does the probability of being a 
non-fatalistic person. This supports our hypothesis that education can weaken the link 
between transmitted culture and beliefs and make individuals more inclined to believe that 
they have greater control over life-events (this result holds in both samples). Unfortunately, 
we are unable to establish a causal link from education to fatalism because a higher level of 
education may reflect an higher level of unobserved ability possessed by an individual, so that 
the decrease in fatalism may be caused by the individual’s higher skills.
11 Perhaps education 
plays a role in this case, too, given that the technology of skill formation is characterized by 
strong complementarities between cognitive skills and non-cognitive traits (Cuhna and 
Heckman, 2007) such as fatalism. Education improves people’s skills, and it may make 
individuals more aware of their abilities and therefore less fatalistic. To be on the safe side, 
we merely state that there is strong evidence for a negative relation between fatalism and 
education. 
Also the relation between health and fatalism takes the expected sign. The reference 
class is ‘very good health’: a worsening in the perceived state of health is accompanied by an 
increase in fatalism.   
The effect of employment status also has the expected sign. Individuals who declare 
that they are self-employed are less likely to be fatalistic (the reference category is full-time 
workers), while the probability of being fatalistic increases for housewives, unemployed 
persons, and students. We are aware that the latter result may be due to reverse causality. By 
definition, a non-fatalistic individual is someone who thinks that s/he has control over his/her 
life, so that it is reasonable to assume that it is the latter attitude which influences the decision 
to undertake self employment, and not vice-versa.  
Also gender plays a role in fatalistic attitudes, with women being more likely to 
believe that life-events are beyond their control. Of course, this can be rationalized in various 
ways mostly reliant on the impact of culture and education. Unfortunately, still today women 
in many countries are far from being emancipated, and values transferred through culture and 
education tend to strengthen an antiquated vision of the female’s role. Hence, it is possible 
that this attitude towards women has generated a feeling of  ‘resignation’. Indeed, this 
interpretation is to some extent supported by the sign of the coefficient of housewives. 
The analysis also suggests the existence of a non-linear relationship (reverse U-
shaped)  between age and fatalism: younger and older people seem to be less fatalistic.   
Finally, as far as religions are concerned, people declaring that they belong to a 
religion show a higher probability of being fatalistic. In particular, being ‘Orthodox’, 
‘Muslim’, ‘Jewish’ or ‘Catholic’ is positively correlated with the probability of being 
fatalistic (with the first two results strongly statistically significant in both columns). The 
second result is well known in sociology. The coefficients relative to ‘Protestant’ and 
‘Buddhist’
12 take positive signs but are not statistically significant. The sign of ‘Hindu’ is 
likely to be due to problems with the Indian sample, because in the 1989-93 wave the sample 
was designed so that 90 percent of respondents were literate (compared to a population 
average of less than 50 percent).
13 Note that these signs are in line with the results obtained 
by Algan and Cahuc (2006b).  
                                                           
11 See Griliches (1977) and Card (2001) for a discussion on the ability bias. 
   
12  Probably, the effect of Buddhist affiliation is captured by the dummy relative to Japan. Algan and Cahuc 
(2006b) report that Buddhist affiliation is almost perfectly correlated  with Japan.  
 
13  In 1999-2004, the survey was designed to be representative of 97% of the population. However, in this case 
too, no sample weights were provided. 
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The overall implications of these data confirm our hypothesis that income, education, 
age (up until a certain age), health, employment status, and being male exert a negative effect 
on fatalism. Still to be discussed is the impact of fatalism on the demand for job security. 
3.4 Cultural based beliefs and demand for job protection  
The next step is to consider whether and how these cultural traits affect the demand 
for job protection. Columns (a) and (b) of table 5 set out the results of a probit regression  of 
JobSecurity on fatalism and trust, controlling for country and wave fixed effects, 
demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, marital status and health status), 
economic characteristics (level of income, employment status) and religion. Column (a) is 
relative to the entire sample, while the analysis reported in column (b) is limited, as usual, to 
representative countries. Column (c) reports the results of a Linear Probability Model on the 
same sample of column (b).  
The signs and the statistical significance of the coefficients are the same in the three 
columns, with the exception of fatalism, which in column (a) is significant only at 10% level. 
This is probably due to the over-representation of wealthier and more educated people in 
some samples extracted from poor countries. As we noted with reference to table 4, both 
income and education can influence fatalism, so this over-representation may mitigate its 
effects, although they are still statistically significant.  
As we expected, demand for job protection is increasing in fatalism and decreasing in 
trust in others. Interestingly, more educated people are less willing to demand job security, 
confirming the idea that education can reduce the perception of unemployment risk 
(D’Orlando and Ferrante, 2009). 
The analysis also shows that there is a gender effect in the demand for job protection: 
being female reduces the probability of demanding job security. This result seems to contrast 
with the analysis reported in table 4, where we showed that females are more likely to be 
fatalistic. However, we controlled the effect of fatalism, so this coefficient should be 
interpreted as the net effect of gender. Furthermore, this result partly confirms (see also the 
result relative to housewife) the idea put forward by Algan and Cahuc (2006b) that job 
protection is more favorable to male insiders than to females 
As to be expected, income (the reference is medium income) exerts a negative impact 
on the demand for job security. In comparison to singles, married individuals tend to demand 
more job security, while separated individuals do so to a lesser extent. Another result in line 
with our expectations concerns the impact of employment status. In the case of ‘full time 
workers’, we find a decrease in the probability of demanding job security with respect to all 
the other employment statuses, with a particularly strong effect for ‘self-employed’ and ‘part 
time workers’. With the exception of ‘retired’, all the coefficients are statistically significant 
at 1% level.  
Building on the latter reassuring results, we now restrict our discussion to a more 
reliable sample which enabled us to enrich the analysis by including institutional variables.    
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N 171782 N 156413 N 156413
Pseudo R2 .0904 Pseudo R2 .0951  R2 .1115
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<0.01
Table 5: Demand for Job Security Vs. Fatalism and Trust
fatalism ‐.00328* fatalism ‐.00423** fatalism ‐.00141**
‐.11232*** ‐.1112*** ‐.03835***
age age age
agesquare ‐.00006*** agesquare ‐.00007*** agesquare ‐.00002***
ageeduc ‐.01079*** ageeduc ‐.01107*** ageeduc ‐.00374***
female ‐.03999*** female ‐.04455*** female ‐.01522***
highincome ‐.07075*** highincome ‐.07510*** highincome ‐.02412***
lowincome lowincome lowincome
widowed widowed widowed




parttime ‐.12860*** parttime ‐.14060*** parttime ‐.04805***
selfemployed ‐.24996*** selfemployed ‐.27223*** selfemployed ‐.08945***
retired ‐.02842* retired ‐.03401** retired ‐.01030*
housewife ‐.08760*** housewife ‐.08337*** housewife ‐.02737***
student ‐.08382*** student ‐.09125*** student ‐.02994***
unemployed ‐.04473*** unemployed ‐.05169*** unemployed ‐.01785***
otherjob ‐.09289*** otherjob ‐.10589*** otherjob ‐.03394***
Controls for health status yes Controls for health status yes Controls for health status yes





3.5 Cultural-based beliefs and labor market institutions in the OECD 
In this section we report the results of analysis based on 20 OECD countries 
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Japan, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, USA)  for which we had information about EPL, SPE (Social Public 
Expenditure) and UB (in this case, the average replacement rate during the first year of 
unemployment), with a total number of observations amounting to around 50,000. The source 
for these two last indicators is Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Eurostat.  
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We first estimated a model of the determinants of the demand for job security 
controlling for country and wave fixed effects; the idea being that the latter effects would 
enable us to control for differences among the overall institutional settings of countries. We 
then estimated a model including explicit controls for labour market institutions (EPL, SPE 
and UB) and for the quality of the legal system. The idea in this case was that people are 
concerned  about  the actual level of protection, i.e. the nominal level adjusted for the extent 
to which regulations are legally enforced. Moreover, we expected that the demand for 
protection would be determined also by the overall quality of the legal system.  To control for 
these factors we adopted the index of the legal structure and security of property rights 
(legalprop) proposed by Gwartney and Lawson et al. (2009). This index ranges from 0-10, 
where 0 corresponds to ‘no judicial independence’, ‘no trusted legal framework exists’, ‘no 
protection of intellectual property’, ‘no integrity of the legal system’ and 10 corresponds to 
‘high judicial independence’, ‘trusted legal framework exists’, ‘protection of intellectual 
property’, ‘integrity of the legal system’.  
The purpose of the analysis was to verify whether protection provided to workers 
through EPL, SPE and UB reduces, as we expected, the demand for job security and whether 
the quality of the legal system affects the latter outcome. Following Tabellini (2005) and 
Aghion et al. (2008), we also expected that the better the quality of the legal system, the lower 
the demand for regulatory institutions would be.  
As preliminary evidence on the relation between culturally-based beliefs and labour 
market institutions, figure 4a and figure 4b show respectively the normalized versions  of 
EPL and RR (1992 and 2002) and SPE (1990 and 2000)  plotted against IF calculated for the 
second and fourth waves. IF appears to be correlated with the measure of EPL strictness (the 
correlation coefficient takes a value of -0.52, p < 0.0007), while there is no evidence of 
correlation between IF and SPE and between IF and RR (the coefficients  of correlation are 
not statistically different from zero). Since IF is higher, fatalism is lower, and the negative 





















.7 .8 .9 1
Index of Fatalism
EPL VS. FATALISM RR VS. FATALISM
pwcorr(IF;EPL)=-0.5240 pvalue:0.0007; pwcorr(IF;RR)=-0.0156 pvalue:0.9261
The indexes are normalized dividing them by their maximum
EPL and RR VS. Fatalism
Figure 4a
 
                                                           
14  The sample of countries is the same as in  table 2. However, because of problems of non-availability of IF we 
were forced to consider only one period for Australia (the second wave) and for New Zealand (the third wave). 











.7 .8 .9 1
Index of Fatalism
pwcorr (SPE;IF)= - 0.2347  p-value: 0.1561






Figure 5a and Figure 5b show the same preliminary analysis for trust in others. We 
find that trust is weakly positively correlated with RR, i.e. the correlation coefficient takes a 
value of 0.29 (p<0.10), while it is not correlated with EPL and SPE, the coefficients of 
correlation being not statistically different from zero. The last result seems very reasonable: 
countries with higher levels of trust in others are less affected by free riding problems, and 
unemployment benefits are perceived as more cost-effective than in countries characterized 


















.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Index of Trust
EPL VS. TRUST RR VS. TRUST
pwcorr(TO;EPL)=-0.2205 pvalue:0.1835; pwcorr(TO;RR)=0.2942  pvalue:0.0730
The indexes are normalized dividing them by their maximum
EPL and RR VS. Trust
Figure 5a
 











.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Index of Trust
pwcorr (SPE;TO)= - 0.1898  p-value: 0.2538





To be stressed is that the econometric analysis reported in this section should not to be 
taken as an attempt to establish causal links: to simplify the exposition, we refer to the 
impacts of fatalism (or of impacts on fatalism), but these should be interpreted as correlations. 
Table 6 repeats the analysis shown in table 5 but with attention restricted to the 20 
OECD countries, and adding controls for EPL, UB and SPE, the quality of the legal system 
(legalprop), the interaction between stringency of EPL and the quality of the legal system, 
(legepl), and the interaction between the quality of the legal system and generosity of SPE 
and UB (legspe, legub). Column (a) shows the results of a probit regression controlling for 
country and wave fixed effects. In Column (b) we  add controls for EPL and UB and for 
legality, while in column (c) we use SPE  instead of UB. Fatalism and trust in others are 
strongly statistically significant in all the models; the coefficients take the expected sign; and 
the coefficients are larger than in the previous sample. The results for the other controls are 
very similar to those reported in table 6.  
The impacts on the demand for job security from labour market institutions are those 
expected. It can be straightforwardly checked that an increase in either EPL or UB leads to a 
decrease in the demand for job security. This appears to contrast with the results obtained by 
Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005), who found a negative impact of EPL on the perception of job 
security, and a positive impact of UB. Therefore, if one controls for subjective culturally-
based beliefs and for the quality of the legal system, EPL does not appear to reduce workers’ 
perceived security. A corollary of this result is that observed international differences in the 
level of labour market regulation should be attributed, at least in part, to underlying 
differences in the quality of legal systems. Finally, the effects of the interactions between 
labour market institutions and the quality of legal systems appear quite complex and non 
linear.  
   


































N 53968 N 53968 N 53968
Pseudo R2 .0567 Pseudo R2 .0597  R2 .0599
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<0.01
Table 6 : Demand for Job Security Vs. Fatalism and Trust for 20 OECD countries
fatalism ‐.01592*** fatalism ‐.01631*** fatalism ‐.01522***
‐.13926*** ‐.13800*** ‐.13638***
age age age
agesquare agesquare ‐.00005** agesquare ‐.00005*
ageeduc ‐.01273*** ageeduc ‐.01442*** ageeduc ‐.01486***
female ‐.04260*** female ‐.04461*** female ‐.0440***
highincome ‐.09645*** highincome ‐.08436*** highincome ‐.09588***
lowincome lowincome lowincome
parttime ‐.13781*** parttime ‐.13245*** parttime ‐.13519***
selfemployed ‐.34343*** selfemployed ‐.35265*** selfemployed ‐.34824***
retired retired retired
housewife ‐.06680*** housewife ‐.06008** housewife ‐.06095**
student ‐.06495* student student
unemployed unemployed unemployed
otherjob otherjob otherjob





Controls for marital status yes Controls for marital status yes Controls for marital status yes
Controls for religions yes Controls for religions yes Controls for religions yes
Controls for health status yes Controls for health status yes Controls for health status yes




4. Summary and conclusions 
People’s identities and choices can be linked to psychological traits and culturally-
based values and prior beliefs. The latter also shape the identities of groups and countries 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Our analysis has shown that people’s fatalism and trust in 
others affect their choices concerning how protection should be given to workers, and that 
this may explain observed international differences among labour market institutions. Our 
paper adds study of the important role played by people’s fatalism, hitherto neglected, to the 
existing economic literature on the link between labour market institutions and culturally-
based prior beliefs. In addition, it provides evidence on the relation between individual socio-
demographic characteristics and these beliefs, giving support to the idea that fatalism and 
trust in others are culturally-based psychological traits that can be partly affected by people’s 
educations.  
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Like Aghion et al. (2008), we find that trust in others is negatively related to the 
demand for job security and, like Ferrante and D'Orlando (2008 and 2009), we find a positive 
relation between fatalism and the demand for job security. In contrast to Clark and Postel-
Vinay (2005), our estimates show that both employment protection legislation and 
unemployment benefits are effective means to provide protection. Finally, our data suggest 
that the quality of the legal system matters in the determination of people’s demand for 
protection.    
In economics, and in democratic regimes, people’s preferences are assumed to be the 
benchmarks against which to evaluate the goodness of institutional and economic outcomes. 
Data seem to show that OECD countries are characterized by different national cultural traits 
and that the latter determine the demand for job protection and, most importantly, how such 
protection should be provided. Nevertheless, the role of country-specific preferences is often 
neglected in the economic analysis of labour market institutions. Indeed, if one believes in 
democratic processes, leaving preferences aside may lead to wrong conclusions on the 
desirability of different institutional regimes and on the political feasibility and optimal 
timing of institutional reforms.  
The role of education in compressing the cost of unemployment risks emerges clearly 
from our exercise: education seems negatively affect the demand for job protection both 
directly and indirectly, i.e. through its impact on fatalism. This result is not surprising, and it 
confirms that the most cost-effective way to inject flexibility into labor markets is to 
compress workers’ psychological costs of facing unemployment risks through the provision 
of education. 
As a final remark, our exercise confirms that culturally-based preferences and attitudes 
cannot be omitted from economic analysis because they shape people’s expectations 
concerning the link between actions and outcomes. And, indeed, besides trust, also fatalism 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 7a: Summary statistics*
variable N mean sd
trust 255399 .29548 .45626
fatalism 248224 6.64010 2.44455
jobsecurity 248476 .68234 .46557
age 264839 41.23718 16.33260
ageeduc 196380 18.27410 5.95704
female 267870 .51920 .49963
married 267870 .58887 .49204
cohabitation 267870 .04164 .19976
divorced 267870 .03604 .18640
separated 267870 .01510 .12194
widowed 267870 .06577 .24787
single 267870 .23408 .42342
lowincome 267870 .28711 .45241
mediumincome 267870 .31392 .46409
highincome 267870 .24839 .43208
vghealth 267870 .18332 .38693
ghealth 267870 .31702 .46531
fhealth 267870 .23815 .42595
phealth 267870 .05764 .23306
vphealth 267870 .01022 .10058
fulltime 267870 .37930 .48521
selfemployed 267870 .08351 .27666
parttime 267870 .07161 .25784
retired 267870 .13492 .34163
housewife 267870 .13939 .34636
student 267870 .06714 .25026
unemployed 267870 .07695 .26651
otherjob 267870 .01664 .12791
romcatholic 267870 .32641 .46890
muslim 267870 .11279 .31634
orthodox 267870 .07638 .26561
protestant 267870 .14009 .34708
jew 267870 .00651 .08045
buddhist 267870 .01455 .11974
hindu 267870 .02379 .15239
otherrel 267870 .06373 .24427
atheist 267870 .19094 .39304
* The sample is the same of table 5 (column a)
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Table 7b: Summary statistics*
variable N mean sd
trust 62163 .40447 .49079
fatalism 64501 6.99561 2.07354
jobsecurity 64488 .63500 .48143
age 65696 44.84364 17.19697
ageeduc 58053 18.34367 5.85693
female 65921 .52821 .49921
married 65921 .57983 .49359
cohabitation 65921 .05182 .22166
divorced 65921 .05061 .21919
separated 65921 .01732 .13048
widowed 65921 .07521 .26373
single 65921 .22104 .41495
lowincome 65921 .26482 .44124
mediumincome 65921 .30895 .46206
highincome 65921 .24651 .43098
vghealth 65921 .20829 .40609
ghealth 65921 .30063 .45854
fhealth 65921 .17641 .38117
phealth 65921 .03947 .19472
vphealth 65921 .00843 .09145
fulltime 65921 .41321 .49241
selfemployed 65921 .05842 .23453
parttime 65921 .08563 .27982
retired 65921 .18225 .38605
housewife 65921 .12697 .33294
student 65921 .05494 .22787
unemployed 65921 .05249 .22301
otherjob 65921 .01670 .12815
romcatholic 65921 .41859 .49333
muslim 65921 .00358 .05973
orthodox 65921 .00279 .05276
protestant 65921 .24473 .42993
jew 65921 .00347 .05884
buddhist 65921 .01789 .13253
hindu 65921 .00103 .03210
otherrel 65921 .05491 .22781
atheist 65921 .24402 .42951
*The sample is the same of table 6
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